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There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is
morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater
harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the
prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe
moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium
between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral
decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off
are almost always deaths. However, the moral principles and psychological
processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other
than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in
the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility
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of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental
economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the
standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity
of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions
between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different
domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic
harms.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is
morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater
harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying
the prohibition. A standard methodology involves devising hypothetical
scenarios describing moral dilemmas in order to probe moral intuitions,
and then coming to a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and
principles. For this purpose, Phillipa Foot (1967) introduced the trolley
problem, which grew into a family of scenarios extended and named
by Judith Thomson (1985).1 The common basis of the scenarios is as
follows: A runaway trolley threatens to kill five men on the track ahead.
It is possible to save the five but, in doing so, one other person would
be killed. The question is whether it is morally permissible to kill one
person in order to save five. In one scenario, bystander, the agent can
save the five by switching a lever that will divert the trolley onto a side-
track. On the side-track is one man, who would be killed. In another
scenario, footbridge, the agent can save the five by pushing a large man off a
footbridge in front of the train, stopping the train and saving the five, but
killing the one. Thomson (1985) surmised that most people would have
the intuition that it is permissible to switch the lever but not to push the
large man. More recent experimental research shows that Thomson was
correct (Petrinovich et al. 1993; Greene et al. 2001; Cushman et al. 2006).
The harms that are traded off in trolley problems are deaths. We
present two experimental studies designed to examine whether the
differences in moral judgements between footbridge and bystander will
generalize across other types of harm than death, including other
bodily harms (both permanent and impermanent), emotional harm and
economic harms.
Death is ubiquitous in the examples discussed in the philosophical
literature, such as: whether to manufacture a gas that saves five, at the
cost of releasing lethal fumes that kill one (Foot, 1967); the permissibility
of strategic versus terror bombing (Quinn, 1989b); splitting a life-saving
1 Thomson named the puzzle of finding a moral principle that could explain the difference
in intuitions between scenarios ‘the trolley problem’. But nowadays one is just as likely to
find the individual scenarios being called ‘trolley problems’.
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medicine between five people who need it versus giving it to one person
who needs it all (Kamm, 1985); allowing people to die of starvation in
Africa versus sending them poisoned food (Unger, 1996); allowing people
to die of starvation in Africa versus walking past someone who is dying
in the street when it would be possible to stop and help (Unger, 1996).
However, the moral principles that are derived from these scenarios are
not supposed to be solely about the permissibility of killing. Rather, they
are about trade-offs between harms more generally conceived; death is
merely an illustrative example. As Warren Quinn (1989a) says, ‘Harm here
is meant to include any evil that can be the upshot of choice, for example,
the loss of privacy, property, or control. But to keep matters simple, my
examples will generally involve physical harm, and the harm in question
will generally be death’ (287, n 2). Quinn (1989b: 334, n 1) makes the same
caveat.
There is an assumption that intuitions about cases involving deaths
will generalize to cases involving other harms. But this is not obviously
true. Loss of privacy, property and control are very different from physical
harm and death. Even if we could place the different harms on a
spectrum according to their severity, death would be at the extreme end
of the spectrum and extreme cases may be treated very differently from
intermediate ones. For instance, in the area of decision-making under
uncertainty, it is well known that the ends of the probability spectrum,
certainty and impossibility, are treated very differently from the possible
but uncertain outcomes in the middle (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
It is not just philosophers who extrapolate general theories from
intuitions associated with life-threatening situations. In his theory of
moral cognition, John Mikhail (2007, 2011) postulates that our moral
intuitions are produced by a ‘Universal Moral Grammar’, a complex
set of rules, concepts and principles that generate structured mental
representations of actions, which underpin our judgements of the
normative status of those actions. He argues that intuitions in trolley
problems ‘can be explained by postulating tacit knowledge of two specific
legal rules: the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of
double effect’ (Mikhail 2007: 145). The theory is supposed to apply to
instances of battery but, in Mikhail’s examples and evidence, the harm
invoked is virtually always death. The sole exception is a hybrid case
where there is a trade-off between death and property damage.2 In a
version of bystander, where there is five million dollars of new railway
2 Peter Unger (1996) also discusses hybrid cases, although not ones involving trolleys, in
the context of an argument that our intuitive responses are not a good guide to moral
values. For instance, we would think it seriously morally wrong if a driver refused to give
someone with a bleeding leg a lift to hospital, causing the loss of the leg, because the blood
would do $5000 of damage to the car’s upholstery. One the other hand, we do not find it
intuitively wrong to ignore a request for $100 from UNICEF that would save 30 children’s
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equipment on the main track and the bystander can throw the switch,
diverting the train onto a side-track and killing a man, Mikhail found that
none of the participants in an experiment judged it morally permissible
to turn the train. This evidence was given in support of an auxiliary
principle, that it is not permissible to throw the switch when the costs
outweigh the benefits. Mikhail’s aim was not to test whether differences in
intuitions between bystander and footbridge cases extend to other types of
harm and, although his theory is framed in terms of battery, the evidence
adduced never involves other bodily harms.
Mikhail’s (2007, 2011) approach is typical of the experimental
literature on trolley problems, where the harmful outcomes of the
actions being judged are virtually always deaths, although the scenario
has sometimes been modified so that it does not involve trolleys (e.g.
Cushman et al. 2006) or extended to include moral dilemmas other than
killing one to save five (e.g. Greene et al. 2004, 2008, 2009; Moore et al.
2008). From these scenarios, broader conclusions are drawn about, for
example, the role of emotion in moral judgement (Greene et al., 2001;
Koenigs et al., 2007), or the dependence of moral judgement on whether
the locus of intervention is the agent of harm itself or the victim who is
moved into its path (Waldmann and Dieterich 2007).
One exception is a pair of probes used by Michael Waldmann and
Jörn Dieterich (2007), where the harm is paraplegia rather than death.
The scenario does not involve trolleys, but it preserves the key features
of trolleys: a threat to many that, in one case, can be prevented by being
redirected toward one person and, in another case, can be prevented by
the physical use of the one.
Virus bystander case:
A virus causing paraplegia threatens four patients. Through the ventilation
system, the virus could be redirected into a room with one patient.
Virus footbridge case:
A virus causing paraplegia threatens four patients. The bone marrow of one
patient could save them. However, the required procedure would lead to
paraplegia in this patient.
They asked participants to rate whether or not the actor in the scenario
should perform the action, on a scale from 1 (definitely not) to 6 (definitely
yes), and found that the bystander case (M = 4.0, SE = 0.25) was rated
higher than footbridge (M = 2.1, SE = 0.18).
lives. The car upholstery case has been included in experiments by Joshua Greene et al.
(2004, 2008). Moore et al. (2008) give subjects a hybrid footbridge-style case, where a man’s
life is saved by pushing a valuable sculpture into the path of a lawnmower. However, it
was a filler task and no results were reported.
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Another exception is found in Shaun Nichols and Ron Mallon (2006),
where participants judged a dilemma based on Foot’s (1967) trolley
scenario but with teacups substituted for people. In their scenarios, a
mother forbids her child from breaking any teacups and then leaves the
house. The teacup version of bystander has the five teacups on a toy train
track, with one teacup on a side-track. In the teacup version of footbridge,
the child can stop a toy truck that is about to smash into five teacups by
throwing and smashing one other cup. They found that in their version
of footbridge involving teacups, 92% of participants said that it was ‘all-in
permissible’ for the protagonist to throw the teacup (they do not report
the results for bystander).
Teacup bystander case:
Billy’s mother leaves the house one day; she says ‘you are forbidden from
breaking any of the teacups that are on the counter’. Later that morning,
Billy starts up his train set and goes to make a snack. When he returns, he
finds that his 18-month-old sister Ann has taken several of the teacups and
placed them on the train tracks. Billy sees that if the train continues on its
present course, it will run through and break five cups. Billy cannot get to
the cups or to the off-switch in time, but he can reach a lever, which will
divert the train to a side track. There is only one cup on the side track. He
knows that the only way to save the five cups is to divert the train to the side
track, which will break the cup on the side track. Billy proceeds to pull the
lever and the train is diverted down the side track, breaking one of the cups.
Teacup footbridge case:
When Susie’s mother leaves the house one day, she says ‘you are forbidden
from breaking any of the teacups that are on the counter’. While Susie is
playing in her bedroom, her 18-month-old brother Fred has taken down
several of the teacups and he has also turned on a mechanical toy truck,
which is about to crush five of the cups. As Fred leaves the room, Susie
walks in and sees that the truck is about to wreck the cups. She is standing
next to the counter with the remaining teacups and she realizes that the only
way to stop the truck in time is by throwing one of the teacups at the truck,
which will break the cup she throws. Susie is in fact an excellent thrower
and knows that if she throws the teacup at the truck she will save the five
cups. Susie proceeds to throw the teacup, which breaks that cup, but it stops
the truck and saves the five other teacups.
Nichols and Mallon’s results suggest that intuitions may not generalize
across all types of harm. However, the breaking of teacups is not a
paradigm case of moral decision making, and, to the extent that it is a
trade-off between harms (presumably to the mother who owns the tea
cups), (a) the harm of having one’s teacups smashed is a very minor
damage to property, and (b) all the harms in the scenario are done to only
one person, the mother.
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It is an open question whether intuitions about life-and-death
outcomes correspond to intuitions about other harms. Our main aim is
to provide an answer to this question. In doing so, we test an assumption
of domain generality that is often made in philosophy and psychology. If
differences were to emerge from experimental research, then they might
provide information that would be useful in understanding the origins,
basis and nature of those intuitions.
If differences do not emerge and trolley intuitions generalize to
economic harms, then that would open up interesting new avenues
of research. In contrast to the trolley literature, which focuses on life–
death hypothetical cases, the paradigm economics experiment involves
participants actually experiencing small economic benefits and harms.
This approach has been used to investigate moral behaviours such as
altruism, fairness, trust, cooperation and reciprocity (e.g. Berg et al. 1995;
Fehr and Schmidt 1999, 2006; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Andreoni and
Miller 2002; Andreoni et al. 2002). It has also been used to complement
and extend research on the Knobe effect, the finding that people say that
harmful foreseen side effects are caused intentionally but helpful ones
are not (Utikal and Fischbacher 2009). For obvious reasons, the original
trolley problem cannot be replicated with real incentives. However, if
the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in hypothetical scenarios
involving only property damage, then that would raise the possibility of
investigating behaviour in trolley problems using economic incentives.
2. STUDY 1
This study was designed to examine whether intuitions in trolley
problems differ depending on the degree of bodily harm suffered by the
victims and to compare death, other bodily harms, and property damage.
2.1 Method
Participants . Participants were voluntary respondents to an online
survey. There were 546 participants: 192 men, 319 women, and 35 who
did not answer the question about their gender. They were not paid for
their participation. The survey was promoted online and through UK
university e-mail lists. The majority of the participants (69%) were British,
the rest came from all over the world. Participants were aged between 15
and 67 years (M = 27.59, SD = 10.38).
Design and materials . We compared 10 scenarios in a 2 (Scenario:
footbridge vs. bystander) × 5 (Type of harm: death, limb loss, broken bones,
bruising, property) between-subjects design. Scenarios were based on the
trolley problem, but the setting was located down a mine to increase the
plausibility of some of the outcomes.
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The bystander-death scenario:
Peter is visiting a mine when he sees an out-of-control trolley that is full of
coal approaching. There are five miners on the trolley track who do not have
time to get out of the way. If nothing is done, they will be killed.
The track has a side-track leading off to the left. Peter is standing next to a
lever. If he pulls the lever, that will turn the trolley onto the side track and
the five miners on the main track will not die. But there is one miner on the
side track who does not have time to get out of the way. If the trolley goes
onto the side track, then the miner on the side track will die.
Peter is aware of all these facts.
Thus, Peter can pull the lever, in which case the one miner will die but the
five miners will not; or Peter can refrain from pulling the lever, in which case
the five miners will die but the one miner will not.
Is it morally wrong for Peter to pull the lever?
The footbridge-death scenario:
Peter is visiting a mine when he sees an out-of-control trolley that is full of
coal approaching. There are five miners on the trolley track who do not have
time to get out of the way. If nothing is done, they will be killed.
Peter is standing on a bridge over the trolley tracks, next to a miner who is
twice as large as Peter. If Peter pushes the miner off the footbridge and onto
the tracks, the trolley will collide with the miner, who weighs just enough
to make it stop, and the five miners on the main track will not die. But the
collision will cause the death of the large miner.
Peter is aware of all these facts.
Thus, Peter can push the miner, in which case the one miner will die but the
five miners will not; or Peter can refrain from pushing the miner, in which
case the five miners will die but the one miner will not.
Is it morally wrong for Peter to push the man?
In the other harm scenarios, we replaced the last sentence of the first
paragraph as follows:
limb loss: If nothing is done, the trolley will roll over their legs and they
will all lose their legs.
broken bones: If nothing is done, the trolley will roll over their legs and their
legs will all be broken.
bruising: If nothing is done, they will be severely bruised and will be
confined to bed for some weeks.
property: There are five rucksacks on the tracks, each containing personal
items including phones and laptops, through no fault of their owners.
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It is not possible for Peter to get the rucksacks off the tracks in time.
The speed of the trolley is such that, if nothing is done, the phones
and the laptops will be crushed.
In each scenario, we made equivalent substitutions for ‘die’ and ‘death’ in
other paragraphs, and removed all references to ‘miners’ in the property
scenario, just referring to ‘rucksacks’. So, in every scenario, the harm
that threatened the five was the same as the harm that befalls the one,
and in the property scenario the choice was to save five rucksacks by
destroying one. The full text of all the scenarios is available in the online
supplementary materials.
Procedure . Participants completed the study in their own time, online,
after following a link to a SurveyGizmo site. Participants read a consent
form and were assured of the anonymity of their data. After granting
consent they were randomly allocated to read only one of the 10 scenarios.
After reading the scenario, they were asked (a) Is it morally wrong for
Peter to push the man/push the rucksack/pull the lever? (Yes/No), (b) Should
Peter push the man/push the rucksack/pull the lever? (Yes/No), (c) Now please
indicate how wrong or how right you think it would be to push the
man/push the rucksack/pull the lever? (0 Definitely wrong to 10 Definitely right).
2.2 Results
For all five levels of harm, there was a significant effect of the bystander
versus footbridge condition on judgements of whether or not the action
was morally wrong: death: χ2 (1, 111) = 50.525, p < 0.001; loss of limb:
χ2 (1, 76) = 28.070, p < 0.001; broken bones: χ2 (1, 99) = 38.500, p <
0.001; bruising: χ2 (1, 131) = 62.662, p < 0.001; property: χ2 (1, 129) =
10.601, p < 0.001. The overall pattern is that more participants judged that
taking the action was morally wrong in the footbridge condition than in the
bystander condition. Figure 1 shows the percentage of participants in each
condition who indicated that ‘No’, it was not morally wrong for Peter to
do the action. We display the data this way in order to make it more easily
comparable with studies that have asked whether the action is permissible
or acceptable.3
3 In deontic logic, anything that is not morally wrong is morally permissible so, in theory, our
results are directly comparable with studies that ask if the action is ‘morally permissible’.
In practice, the conversational usage of ‘morally wrong’ and ‘morally permissible’ may
differ from that prescribed by formal logic. In particular one might worry that ‘morally
permissible’ is not often used in everyday speech, hence our asking if the action was
‘morally wrong’. Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2008) use the wording ‘morally wrong’ for
similar reasons. Note that O’Hara et al. (2010) tested wording effects in moral judgements
and concluded that studies with different wordings can legitimately be compared.
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FIGURE 1. Results of Study 1: Percentage of participants in each condition who
said ‘No’ it was not morally wrong for Peter to do the action.
Within the bystander condition, there was no effect of type of harm, χ2
(4, 271) = 2.665, p = 0.615, as there was exceptionally high agreement
among participants that it was not morally wrong to pull a lever to
sacrifice one person to save five people from injury or death, or to damage
one rucksack to save five. Within the footbridge conditions there was a
significant effect of type of harm, χ2 (4, 275) = 57.321, p < 0.001. Pairwise
contrasts reveal that this is driven by differences in judgements in the
property-footbridge condition, where significantly more people said that
pushing the rucksack was not morally wrong compared with pushing
the man in all four other footbridge conditions (all p < 0.001, see Table 1).
In the other footbridge conditions, the majority of participants judged the
action to be morally wrong whereas, in the property-footbridge condition,
the majority of participants judged pushing the rucksack not to be morally
wrong. Hence the difference between the bystander and footbridge scenarios
was smallest in the property conditions, with 70% of people in the property-
footbridge condition judging it not to be morally wrong to destroy property
in order to save larger amounts of property, compared with 92% in
property-bystander (although, as noted above, this difference is still highly
significant).
In the follow-up question ‘Should Peter push the man/push the
rucksack/pull the lever?’ there is no significant difference in the bystander
condition between the proportion of people in each of the five different
harm conditions who judge that ‘Yes’, Peter should take the action: χ2
(4, 264) = 2.877, p = 0.58, most people indicate ‘Yes’. However, there is
a significant effect of scenario in the footbridge condition: χ2 (4, 268) =
37.869, p < 0.001. Here, most people judge that ‘No’, Peter should not
take the action, except in the property condition where 62% of people
indicated that ‘Yes’, he should push the rucksack onto the track to save the
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measure harm
death
loss of
limbs
broken
bones bruising property
bystander
morally wrong, % No 85% a 86% a 89% a 83% a 92% a
should, % Yes 80% a 85% a 81% a 76% a 87% a
right–wrong, mean 6.53 a 6.52 a 6.66 a 6.34 a 7.31 a
(SD) (2.51) (1.83) (1.92) (2.30) (2.47)
footbridge
morally wrong, % No 18% a 23% a 28% a 14% a 70% b
should, % Yes 16% a 28% a 33% a 17% a 62% b
right–wrong, mean 3.00 a 2.75 a 3.75 a 2.75 a 5.79 b
(SD) (3.10) (2.38) (3.26) (2.16) (2.64)
Note: Percentages on the same row that do not share a common subscript differ at p <
0.05 according to a χ2 test. Means on the same row that do not share a common subscript
differ at p < 0.05 according to a post-hoc Tukey test.
TABLE 1. Results of Study 1: Percentages of ‘no’ responses to the question
‘Is it morally wrong to do the action?’, percentage of ‘yes’ responses to the
question ‘Should Peter do the action?’, and mean right–wrong ratings.
other property from being damaged. The pattern of the effects matches the
‘is it morally wrong?’ results already described (see Table 1). Comparing
the answers to the question about whether it is morally wrong to take
the action with the answers about whether Peter should actually take the
action, using McNemar tests for each of the 10 scenarios, we found no
significant differences at all between these two questions. So if people
thought the action was morally wrong, then they subsequently judged
that Peter should not do it.
The results of a two-way ANOVA on the 0 to 10 ratings of how wrong
or right taking the action would be show that there was a significant
difference between the five harms, F(4, 523) = 12.902, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.09, and between the bystander and footbridge scenarios, F(1, 523) =
186.467, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.26. There was also a significant interaction
between the type of harm and the bystander and footbridge conditions, F(4,
523) = 3.852, p = 0.004, partial η2 = 0.029. As is clear from Figure 2,
there is no significant difference in the bystander ratings across the types of
harm, the ratings are consistently high, and the ratings in footbridge are all
significantly lower (see also Table 1). According to a test for simple effects,
the difference in ratings between bystander and footbridge conditions was
highly statistically significant for all the harms tested (all p < 0.001).
The difference between bystander and footbridge (although still significant)
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FIGURE 2. Results of Study 1: Mean ratings of how wrong or right it would be to
take the action.
decreases in the property condition because, in the footbridge condition, it
is judged less wrong to harm one in order to save five when the harm
is property damage, rather than bodily harm (see Table 1). In fact, with
a mean right–wrong rating of 5.79, the property-footbridge is the only one
of the footbridge scenarios where the mean rating indicates that it is right
to take the action. The results of the right–wrong ratings corroborate the
results of the binary ‘is it morally wrong?’ question.
3. STUDY 2
Study 1 examined degrees of physical harm and damage to property
in trolley dilemmas. We also wanted to examine consequences such as
emotional distress, and economic consequences such as losing one’s job
or losing significant amounts of money − harms that were not obviously
possible to investigate with the trolley scenario. Thus we designed a new
scenario, the sauna dilemma. The sauna dilemma preserves the key feature
of trolley problems, namely a harm that threatens five people, which
could be diverted onto one by pressing a switch (bystander) or stopped by
pushing one person into its path (footbridge). This allowed us to investigate
a broader range of harms.
3.1 Method
Participants . Participants were voluntary respondents to an online
survey. There were 386 participants: 152 men, 239 women and 37 people
who did not answer the question about gender. They were not paid for
their participation. The majority of the participants (68%) were British, the
rest came from all over the world. Participants were aged between 17 and
72 years (M = 28.29, SD = 11.64). Study 1 and Study 2 were promoted
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together and accessed via the same web link, to reduce the likelihood that
the same people would participate in both studies (where it was clear that
a person had taken part in a study more than once we used only their first
set of data).
Design and materials . We compared eight scenarios in a 2 (Scenario:
footbridge vs. bystander) × 4 (Type of harm: death, job loss, financial loss,
emotional distress) between-subjects design.
The bystander-emotional distress scenario:
Five strangers are having a nude sauna in a spa in Finland. They all have
strict principles of modesty but have each made an exception to their usual
rule because nude saunas are the norm in Finland. Unknown to them the
spa keeps surveillance cameras in the sauna. The camera has malfunctioned
and is about to feed live to the internet. There will be five seconds of internet
feed before the camera automatically switches off. The nudity of those in the
sauna will be exposed in public and people that they interact with in daily
life will be able to see the pictures. The five will discover that they were
nude in public. That will breach their principles of modesty and they will
each suffer extreme emotional distress.
Peter is outside the sauna and knows what is about to happen. He cannot
turn off the camera or the internet feed any faster than it will turn off by
itself. But by pressing a switch, he can make the five seconds of internet feed
come from a surveillance camera in the spa’s other sauna and therefore the
five people will not suffer the extreme emotional distress that would result
from their being nude in public. However, there is one person in the other
sauna, who also has a strict principle of modesty and will suffer extreme
emotional distress because he will be nude in public and people that he
interacts with in daily life will see the pictures.
None of the people will get any compensation because the sauna will go
bankrupt due to the negative publicity.
Peter is aware of all these facts.
Thus, Peter can press the switch, in which case the one person will suffer
extreme emotional distress but the five people will not; or Peter can refrain
from pressing the switch, in which case the five people will each suffer
extreme emotional distress but the one person will not.
Is it morally wrong for Peter to press the switch?
The footbridge-emotional distress scenario:
Five strangers are having a nude sauna in a spa in Finland. They all have
strict principles of modesty but have each made an exception to their usual
rule because nude saunas are the norm in Finland. Unknown to them the
spa keeps surveillance cameras in the sauna. The camera has malfunctioned
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and is about to feed live to the internet. There will be five seconds of internet
feed before the camera automatically switches off. The nudity of those in the
sauna will be exposed in public and people that they interact with in daily
life will be able to see the pictures. The five will discover that they were
nude in public. That will breach their principles of modesty and they will
each suffer extreme emotional distress.
Peter is outside the sauna and knows what is about to happen. He cannot
turn off the camera or the internet feed any faster than it will turn off by
itself. But he can push a sixth person, who is nude and waiting to go into
the sauna, into the room. This person will be pushed right in front of the
camera, obscuring the other five for the five seconds of internet feed and
therefore the five people will not suffer the extreme emotional distress that
would result from their being nude in public. However, the sixth person also
has a strict principle of modesty and will suffer extreme emotional distress
because he will be nude in public and people that he interacts with in daily
life will see the pictures.
None of the people will get any compensation because the sauna will go
bankrupt due to the negative publicity.
Peter is aware of all these facts.
Thus, Peter can push the man, in which case the one person will suffer
extreme emotional distress but the five people will not; or Peter can refrain
from pushing the man, in which case the five people will each suffer extreme
emotional distress but the one person will not.
Is it morally wrong for Peter to push the man?
In the other harm scenarios, we replaced the last sentence of the first
paragraph as follows:
job loss: However their jobs require that they be modest in public, so they
will each lose their jobs as a result. Given their age and the economic
conditions, they will not find new jobs.
financial loss: The five in the sauna do not care about modesty, or being
nude on the internet per se, but each one will lose a contract worth
£10 000 as a result of having been nude on the internet.
death: However the five are each members of a religious sect and
extremists from the sect will object to the nudity and assassinate them
as a result.
We made equivalent substitutions for ‘emotional distress’ in other
paragraphs. In every scenario, the harm that threatened the five was the
same as the harm that befalls the one. The full text of all the scenarios is
available in the online supplementary materials.
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FIGURE 3. Results of Study 2: Percentage of participants in each condition who
said ‘No’ it was not morally wrong for Peter to do the action.
Procedure . As in Study 1, participants completed the study in their own
time, online, after following a link to a SurveyGizmo site. Participants
read a consent form and were assured of the anonymity of their data.
After granting consent they were randomly allocated to read only one
of the eight scenarios. After reading the scenarios they were asked (a)
Is it morally wrong for Peter to push the man/press the switch? (Yes/No),
and (b) Should Peter push the man/press the switch? (Yes/No), (c) Now
please indicate how wrong or how right you think it would be to push
the man/press the switch (0 Definitely wrong to 10 Definitely right).
3.2 Results
Figure 3 shows the percentage of participants in each condition who said
that ‘No’, it was not morally wrong for Peter to do the action. Our reasons
for displaying the data this way are the same as those in Study 1.
For all four types of harm, there was a significant effect of the bystander
versus footbridge scenarios on judgements of whether or not the action was
morally wrong: death: χ2 (1, 122) = 23.199, p < 0.001; job loss: χ2 (1, 95) =
6.786, p = 0.009; financial loss: χ2 (1, 103) = 20.405, p < 0.001; emotional
distress: χ2 (1, 108) = 9.030, p = 0.003. The overall pattern is that more
participants in the footbridge than in the bystander conditions judge the
action to be morally wrong.
Within the bystander condition, there was a significant effect of type
of harm, χ2 (3, 235) = 10.145, p = 0.017. This was because only 50% of
participants judged that it was not morally wrong to push the switch and
cause emotional distress, which was significantly fewer than the number
of people in the job loss and financial loss scenarios who judged that it was
not morally wrong to push the switch (see Table 2). Within the footbridge
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measure harm
death job loss
financial
loss
emotional
distress
bystander
morally wrong, % No 64% a, b 70% b 78% b 50% a
should, % Yes 63% a 67% a 68% a 40% b
right–wrong, mean 5.02 a, b 5.64 a 5.66 a 4.20 b
(SD) (2.40) (2.89) (2.55) (2.84)
footbridge
morally wrong, % No 20% a, c 43% b 33% b, c 22% a, c
should, % Yes 32% a, b 50% a 36% a, b 22% b
right–wrong, mean 3.00 a 2.75 a 3.75 a 2.75 a
(SD) (3.10) (2.38) (3.26) (2.16)
Note: Percentages on the same row that do not share a common subscript differ
at p < 0.05 according to a χ2 test. Means on the same row that do not share a
common subscript differ at p < 0.05 according to a post-hoc Tukey test.
TABLE 2. Results of Study 2: Percentages of ‘no’ responses to the question
‘Is it morally wrong to do the action?’, percentage of ‘yes’ responses to
the question ‘Should Peter do the action?’ and mean right–wrong ratings.
condition there was a marginally significant effect of type of harm, χ2 (3,
193) = 7.082, p = 0.069. This is because the percentage of participants who
judged that it was not morally wrong to push the man into the room and
cause him to lose his job was higher than the percentage of participants
who judged that it was not morally wrong when pushing him would
result in his death or emotional distress (although not significantly more
than if it would just cause financial loss). The percentage of participants
who judged that it was not morally wrong to harm one to save five when
the harm was emotional distress was not significantly different from that
when the outcome was death, in both the footbridge and bystander scenarios.
The full results are shown in Table 2.
Again, the pattern of judgements about whether Peter should push
the man closely followed that of the judgements about whether it would
be morally wrong to do so. Within the bystander condition, there was a
significant effect of type of harm, χ2 (3, 235) = 10.145, p = 0.017. Pairwise
comparisons show that this is because participants were less likely to
judge that Peter should push the man when it caused emotional distress,
which was also the only scenario in which the majority of participants
judged that he should not push the man (see Table 2). Within the footbridge
condition, there was a marginally significant effect of type of harm, χ2
(3, 193) = 7.082, p = 0.069. In this condition, the majority of participants
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FIGURE 4. Results of Study 2: Mean ratings of how wrong or right it would be to
take the action.
judged that Peter should push the man, but more people judged that
he shouldn’t push when it resulted in emotional distress rather than job
loss (p = 0.008). Comparing the answers to the question about whether
it is morally wrong to do the action with the answers about whether
Peter should actually take the action, using McNemar tests for each of the
eight scenarios, found no significant differences at all between these two
questions, as in Study 1. So if people thought that the action was morally
wrong then they subsequently said that Peter should not do it.
A two-way ANOVA on the 0 to 10 ratings of how wrong or how right
taking the action would be shows that there was a significant difference
between the four types of harm, F(3, 403) = 4.620, p = 0.003, partial
η2 = 0.03. Post hoc pairwise comparisons show that the ratings of how
right or wrong it is to take the action in the emotional distress condition
(M = 3.66) is significantly lower (it is seen as more wrong) than in the
financial loss (M = 4.88) and job loss (M = 5.15) conditions, but is not rated
significantly differently from ratings in the death condition (M = 4.23) –
see Table 2. There is a significant difference between the ratings in the
bystander and footbridge conditions overall, the action being rated as more
right in the bystander condition, F(1, 403) = 30.215, p < 0.001, partial η2 =
0.07. A test for simple effects shows that the differences between bystander
and footbridge were statistically significant for all types of harm (all p <
0.05). There was no significant interaction between the type of harm and
scenario, F(3, 403) = 0.377, p = 0.769. As is clear from Figure 4 there is a
significant difference in the bystander ratings across type of harm as the
emotional distress scenario is rated as wrong (M = 4.20), the death scenario
is rated at the neutral point between right and wrong (M = 5.02) and
both death and emotional distress are rated as significantly more wrong than
financial loss (M = 5.66) or job loss (M = 5.64). The ratings across harms in
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the footbridge condition do not differ significantly (F(3, 187) = 1.482, p =
0.22): they are all low and the actions are all rated as being morally wrong
(see Table 2).
4. DISCUSSION OF THE STUDIES
The difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge
scenarios does not depend on the outcome being death or serious injury.
The difference is robust across different domains and levels of physical
and non-physical harm, and also across our two different dilemmas, the
trolley and the sauna.
In Study 1, the difference in intuitions is sharply attenuated but
not eliminated (it is still highly significant) when the loss is merely of
property; the results for death and other physical injuries are largely
similar to one another, and the results for death are comparable to
those from other trolley studies (e.g. Mikhail 2007; Waldmann and
Dieterich 2007). The attenuation is driven by the increased percentage
of participants who judged that it would not be wrong to push the
rucksack in property-footbridge, compared with the number who judged
that it would not be wrong to push the man in the physical injuries
scenarios.
In Study 2, the difference was replicated across a range of non-
physical forms of harm. The percentage of participants who judged that
it would not be wrong to switch the lever in bystander varied across the
different harms, as did the percentage who said that it would not be wrong
to push the man in footbridge, but the difference in responses between
bystander and footbridge that is found in the standard trolley problem was
always preserved.
In philosophy, the difference in moral intuitions between bystander
and footbridge is deployed most often in support of the doctrine of double
effect, that it is sometimes worse to intend a harm than to produce
that same harm as a foreseen side effect, when intending something
else. In bystander the agent’s aim is to divert the train and it is an
unfortunate side effect that there is a person on the side-track. In contrast,
in footbridge the death of the man on the bridge is intended as a necessary
part of the plan to stop the train: if the man on the bridge does not
die then the train will not stop. The cases have also been discussed
with respect to the doctrine of doing and allowing, that ‘it is often more
acceptable to let a certain harm befall someone than actively to bring the
harm about’ (Quinn 1989b: 334). Although there is a presumption that
intuitions about deaths will generalize, in both these doctrines there is
a qualifier, that they are ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ operative. Hence, even
if the difference in intuitions did not generalize across domains and
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levels of harm, that would not decisively refute the principles. However,
intuitions about trolley problems with different domains and levels of
harm are still of interest because they are relevant for determining the
scope of the principles and the extent to which they are operative. Our
data is encouraging for people who deploy these intuitions because
it suggests that they are fairly general across domains and levels
of harm, with the difference between bystander and footbridge being
preserved.
Our experiment was not intended to discriminate between different
psychological theories and, because of the design of our scenarios, our
results are consistent with theories that depend on the difference between
pressing switches to divert trains and pushing people into their path, such
as Greene et al.’s (2009) theory of the interaction between intention and
personal force, Waldmann and Dieterich’s (2007) theory of agent versus
patient intervention, and Mikhail’s (2007, 2011) theory of a Universal
Moral Grammar. However, the theories may differ in how easily they
can accommodate the results from the non-lethal dilemmas, especially the
data on property damage.
The theories of Greene et al. (2009) and Waldmann and Dieterich
(2007) were both developed to explain results from life or death scenarios.
Waldman and Dieterich include the paraplegia case but Greene et al. give
no indication as to whether or not their theory is meant to be domain
specific. Neither of these theories addresses the case where it is an item of
property that is being acted on, rather than a person. However, it is easy to
see how the theories could be extended to include bodily harm and even
property damage, by allowing pushes and interventions to be performed
on inanimate objects.
In contrast, Mikhail’s (2011) theory of a Universal Moral Grammar
is concerned with explaining near-universal prohibitions on homicide
and causing bodily harm (133). Hence, according to the Universal Moral
Grammar theory, it should not make a difference to people’s moral
intuitions if death is replaced with bodily injury. Our results support
that claim. In the property scenarios, there is no battery or contact with
a person, so Mikhail’s theory makes no predictions and, unlike the other
psychological theories discussed above, the emphasis on battery (rather
than just the principle of double effect) means that it is hard to see how the
Universal Moral Grammar theory could be extended to explain intuitions
in the property scenario.
Of course, this does not necessarily count against the theory. One can
think of principled reasons why we might wish to distinguish the property
case from the other trolley scenarios. For instance a standard objection
to utilitarianism is that it ignores the ‘separateness of persons’ (Rawls,
1971), that is, it allows one person to be made worse off in order to
provide benefits for others. Arguably, this objection is more plausible in
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the domain of bodily injury than in the domain of relatively small losses
of property.4
Further, although the property scenarios did exhibit the standard
difference between bystander and footbridge, participants were much less
likely to judge it morally wrong to push the rucksack in the property-
footbridge scenario than in the other footbridge scenarios, and it was also
the only footbridge scenario where the action was rated on the ‘right’ side
of the right–wrong scale. So our results could support an argument that
property damage belongs in a different moral domain from bodily harm
and death.
In the sauna scenarios, job loss and financial loss are treated
equivalently, and they are treated differently from emotional distress. A
job’s main function is arguably to bring in money so, in theory, a job loss
could be compensated for by a sum of money equal to lifetime expected
earnings. Hence it may not be surprising that our participants treated
the job loss and the financial loss scenarios equivalently. This idea places
both the scenarios firmly in the economic domain. In contrast, emotional
distress seems like a very personal sort of harm. It is plausible that moral
judgements differ in the economic and the personal domains, as moral
thinking may be different when it involves economic rather than personal
relationships (Rai and Fiske 2011).5
Death and emotional distress are also treated equivalently in the sauna
scenarios. In the trolley study, we found that bodily harms are treated
equivalently to death. It may be that emotional distress is perceived as
being a type of bodily harm. After all, emotions typically have physical
effects. Thus, causing emotional distress may be perceived as a very
negative thing to do, even worse than causing someone to lose their job or
a large amount of money.
Alternatively, it may be that underlying our moral judgements in
trolley problems there is a trade-off between the magnitude of the harm
prevented and the strength of the one person’s right not to be harmed,
so the wrongness of acting depends on their relative magnitudes. Acting
in a trolley problem might be considered wrong if the right of the one
outweighed the magnitude of the harm prevented. When the harm is
death, the harm prevented is very great but the right of the victim not
to be harmed may be very strong. When the harm is emotional distress,
both the harm and the right may be correspondingly weaker. Then, in
order to produce the pattern of moral intuitions that we found when
the outcome was job loss or financial loss, in those two scenarios the
decrease in harm (that surely occurs compared with when the outcome
is death), must be relatively small compared to the weakening of the
4 We thank Christian List for bringing this point to our attention.
5 We thank Armin Schulz for suggesting the two points in this paragraph to us.
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right not to be harmed, which must be relatively large. Furthermore,
compared with the emotional distress conditions, the increase in harm
must be relatively large but the strengthening of the right relatively small.
Some philosophers have seen trolley problems as embodying a conflict
between rights (Foot, 1967; Quinn, 1989a, 1989b). However, whether
philosophical theories can allow trade-offs between harms and rights is
another question; at least some theories do not (e.g. Nozick, 1974).
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